1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:20,590 I 2 00:00:24,400 --> 00:00:22,510 launched high above the clouds and 3 00:00:26,560 --> 00:00:24,410 filtering atmosphere on February 4 00:00:28,960 --> 00:00:26,570 fourteen nineteen eighty the solar 5 00:00:31,930 --> 00:00:28,970 maximum Observatory is a source of very 6 00:00:33,190 --> 00:00:31,940 detailed information about the Sun for 7 00:00:35,680 --> 00:00:33,200 the first nine months of the plan 8 00:00:38,710 --> 00:00:35,690 two-year mission the satellite collected 9 00:00:40,390 --> 00:00:38,720 spectacular new data hundreds of 10 00:00:41,979 --> 00:00:40,400 scientists gathered at NASA's Goddard 11 00:00:44,260 --> 00:00:41,989 Space Flight Center in Greenbelt 12 00:00:46,420 --> 00:00:44,270 Maryland in a ground observatories 13 00:00:49,060 --> 00:00:46,430 around the world to study the Sun and 14 00:00:51,040 --> 00:00:49,070 solar flares scientists made numerous 15 00:00:53,860 --> 00:00:51,050 discoveries and raised many new 16 00:00:56,200 --> 00:00:53,870 questions about the Sun then in late 17 00:00:58,090 --> 00:00:56,210 nineteen eighty-three fuses failed in 18 00:01:00,280 --> 00:00:58,100 the attitude control subsystem module 19 00:01:02,079 --> 00:01:00,290 this meant that the satellite could no 20 00:01:05,049 --> 00:01:02,089 longer point precisely at the 21 00:01:06,760 --> 00:01:05,059 observation areas on the Sun fortunately 22 00:01:09,130 --> 00:01:06,770 solar max was the first of a new breed 23 00:01:11,530 --> 00:01:09,140 of satellites build of standardized 24 00:01:14,410 --> 00:01:11,540 components and designed to be repaired 25 00:01:16,750 --> 00:01:14,420 in space the faulty attitude control 26 00:01:19,090 --> 00:01:16,760 module is one of the three replaceable 27 00:01:21,910 --> 00:01:19,100 box-like units that control power 28 00:01:24,789 --> 00:01:21,920 command functions and the positioning of 29 00:01:26,830 --> 00:01:24,799 the satellite these units are part of 30 00:01:30,069 --> 00:01:26,840 the multi-mission modular spacecraft or 31 00:01:33,279 --> 00:01:30,079 mms which makes up the lower portion of 32 00:01:35,980 --> 00:01:33,289 the solar max satellite the upper 33 00:01:38,789 --> 00:01:35,990 portion the observatory contains seven 34 00:01:40,870 --> 00:01:38,799 different instruments for solar research 35 00:01:42,459 --> 00:01:40,880 however a considerable amount of 36 00:01:44,740 --> 00:01:42,469 planning and preparation had to be 37 00:01:48,160 --> 00:01:44,750 accomplished before that repair could 38 00:01:50,919 --> 00:01:48,170 occur the solar maximum repair mission 39 00:02:15,460 --> 00:01:50,929 in 1984 chalked up a number of 40 00:02:19,450 --> 00:02:18,040 these successes were possible because of 41 00:02:21,700 --> 00:02:19,460 some of the unique management approaches 42 00:02:25,000 --> 00:02:21,710 and decisions made back in the late 43 00:02:26,590 --> 00:02:25,010 1960s and early 1970s certainly there 44 00:02:28,870 --> 00:02:26,600 must be some very interesting management 45 00:02:31,690 --> 00:02:28,880 lessons learned from the mms and solar 46 00:02:33,490 --> 00:02:31,700 max experience i'm dutch funny retreat 47 00:02:35,140 --> 00:02:33,500 on behalf of the NASA program and 48 00:02:37,420 --> 00:02:35,150 project management training and 49 00:02:39,550 --> 00:02:37,430 development initiative now let's go to 50 00:02:42,130 --> 00:02:39,560 Goddard Space Flight Center and get some 51 00:02:46,960 --> 00:02:42,140 insight on the mms from frank cipollina 52 00:02:49,600 --> 00:02:46,970 the project manager for the mms thanks 53 00:02:52,090 --> 00:02:49,610 for joining us sepi what were some of 54 00:02:54,460 --> 00:02:52,100 the more dominant management challenges 55 00:02:58,390 --> 00:02:54,470 that allowed for the development of the 56 00:03:02,050 --> 00:02:58,400 modular spacecraft well that's the most 57 00:03:05,560 --> 00:03:02,060 dominant challenge was the desire to try 58 00:03:09,820 --> 00:03:05,570 to fly more science at less cost and the 59 00:03:12,699 --> 00:03:09,830 period of the late sixties inflation was 60 00:03:15,220 --> 00:03:12,709 beginning to skyrocket the Apollo 61 00:03:18,340 --> 00:03:15,230 program was coming down phasing down 62 00:03:21,490 --> 00:03:18,350 along with it the budgets were dropping 63 00:03:24,370 --> 00:03:21,500 off and yet from a scientific taste or 64 00:03:26,830 --> 00:03:24,380 desire or flavor we were getting many 65 00:03:28,990 --> 00:03:26,840 many good new missions to fly and 66 00:03:30,910 --> 00:03:29,000 searching desperately to find the 67 00:03:34,330 --> 00:03:30,920 dollars as an agency to fly those new 68 00:03:37,210 --> 00:03:34,340 scientific missions and that was really 69 00:03:39,880 --> 00:03:37,220 the challenge that we as a center try to 70 00:03:42,370 --> 00:03:39,890 step up to since we are a scientific 71 00:03:45,030 --> 00:03:42,380 Space Flight Center well how can you 72 00:03:48,160 --> 00:03:45,040 answer a question like 73 00:03:53,050 --> 00:03:48,170 well when I think back I am amazed at 74 00:03:55,300 --> 00:03:53,060 how how it came out but in fact the the 75 00:03:58,210 --> 00:03:55,310 aspects of answering it took four years 76 00:04:01,090 --> 00:03:58,220 of very very hard work and an intense 77 00:04:05,740 --> 00:04:01,100 team of experienced scientists and 78 00:04:07,810 --> 00:04:05,750 engineers the den center director 1970 79 00:04:12,190 --> 00:04:07,820 formalized such a team and challenge 80 00:04:14,800 --> 00:04:12,200 them basically to look at what are the 81 00:04:17,710 --> 00:04:14,810 elements of spacecraft cost and how 82 00:04:21,009 --> 00:04:17,720 could we in fact reduce those costs that 83 00:04:25,600 --> 00:04:21,019 team concentrated on looking at the 84 00:04:28,240 --> 00:04:25,610 space crafts of the 1960s 150 280 some 85 00:04:30,580 --> 00:04:28,250 odd spacecrafts the NASA designed built 86 00:04:32,320 --> 00:04:30,590 and launched in that decade and they 87 00:04:34,060 --> 00:04:32,330 focused not so much with the design 88 00:04:36,130 --> 00:04:34,070 characteristics of the space crafts but 89 00:04:39,240 --> 00:04:36,140 rather with the design characteristics 90 00:04:42,130 --> 00:04:39,250 as how they related to cost and the cost 91 00:04:44,470 --> 00:04:42,140 aspects and then finally with that 92 00:04:46,990 --> 00:04:44,480 database we went to private industry and 93 00:04:51,100 --> 00:04:47,000 we did some rather significant economic 94 00:04:54,550 --> 00:04:51,110 studies focusing on design parameters as 95 00:04:57,190 --> 00:04:54,560 a function of cost but what were some of 96 00:05:00,550 --> 00:04:57,200 the findings of those studies well touch 97 00:05:02,650 --> 00:05:00,560 there were four major findings of the 98 00:05:06,130 --> 00:05:02,660 studies the first one not so surprising 99 00:05:08,770 --> 00:05:06,140 said that in the period of the 60s we 100 00:05:12,640 --> 00:05:08,780 did not have any significant commonality 101 00:05:14,470 --> 00:05:12,650 of space crafts second findings said 102 00:05:16,720 --> 00:05:14,480 that even though we had point design 103 00:05:19,450 --> 00:05:16,730 spacecrafts within those space crafts 104 00:05:23,170 --> 00:05:19,460 were in fact a lot of common boxes black 105 00:05:25,180 --> 00:05:23,180 boxes equipment and the third finding 106 00:05:26,850 --> 00:05:25,190 which was probably the most significant 107 00:05:30,850 --> 00:05:26,860 from a cost containment point of view 108 00:05:33,220 --> 00:05:30,860 was the fact that almost the vast 109 00:05:35,740 --> 00:05:33,230 majority of the spacecraft developments 110 00:05:37,600 --> 00:05:35,750 we were spending anywhere from thirty 111 00:05:40,600 --> 00:05:37,610 three percent to sixty percent of the 112 00:05:43,600 --> 00:05:40,610 total program costs in the integration 113 00:05:46,630 --> 00:05:43,610 and test phase of the spacecraft that in 114 00:05:49,510 --> 00:05:46,640 itself highlighted something that 115 00:05:50,980 --> 00:05:49,520 perhaps we could deal with from new 116 00:05:52,200 --> 00:05:50,990 spacecraft architecture new spacecraft 117 00:05:54,779 --> 00:05:52,210 design 118 00:05:57,059 --> 00:05:54,789 and in effect that really said we were 119 00:05:59,850 --> 00:05:57,069 spending a lot of time reinventing the 120 00:06:01,680 --> 00:05:59,860 spacecraft wheels when in fact the only 121 00:06:04,379 --> 00:06:01,690 thing that was changing was the outside 122 00:06:06,960 --> 00:06:04,389 architecture of the spacecraft the last 123 00:06:09,150 --> 00:06:06,970 point was the point that kind of gave us 124 00:06:12,420 --> 00:06:09,160 credence for multi mission capability 125 00:06:15,390 --> 00:06:12,430 and that is that for most of those 150 126 00:06:17,969 --> 00:06:15,400 to 180 missions many of those could be 127 00:06:20,730 --> 00:06:17,979 synthesized into four different 128 00:06:23,339 --> 00:06:20,740 performance categories and if somehow we 129 00:06:25,320 --> 00:06:23,349 could design a spacecraft that could 130 00:06:27,600 --> 00:06:25,330 meet the performance requirements of 131 00:06:29,939 --> 00:06:27,610 those four categories we have the 132 00:06:32,400 --> 00:06:29,949 essence of a system which would not 133 00:06:35,070 --> 00:06:32,410 necessitate so to speak reinventing the 134 00:06:37,140 --> 00:06:35,080 spacecraft for those four types of 135 00:06:39,300 --> 00:06:37,150 missions but what was some of the 136 00:06:41,490 --> 00:06:39,310 programmatic issues in the environment 137 00:06:47,730 --> 00:06:41,500 that allowed for the acceptance of the 138 00:06:49,260 --> 00:06:47,740 modular spacecraft concept Pat I guess 139 00:06:51,120 --> 00:06:49,270 it could be summarized by one word 140 00:06:53,640 --> 00:06:51,130 netword with skepticism there was a 141 00:06:56,760 --> 00:06:53,650 tremendous amount of skepticism although 142 00:06:58,649 --> 00:06:56,770 people saw economic studies saw the cost 143 00:07:01,710 --> 00:06:58,659 benefits that am elated from those 144 00:07:03,120 --> 00:07:01,720 studies the most significant problem 145 00:07:05,850 --> 00:07:03,130 that we had was what we were proposing 146 00:07:07,709 --> 00:07:05,860 was a revolutionary spacecraft and in 147 00:07:10,800 --> 00:07:07,719 proposing a revolutionary spacecraft 148 00:07:12,570 --> 00:07:10,810 there's always this fear that a it may 149 00:07:14,580 --> 00:07:12,580 not work technically when it's once it's 150 00:07:17,790 --> 00:07:14,590 put in orbit the risk is very high and 151 00:07:19,830 --> 00:07:17,800 the second point is the fact that in the 152 00:07:22,140 --> 00:07:19,840 development process it may not be 153 00:07:23,939 --> 00:07:22,150 feasible to contain the cost growth you 154 00:07:26,219 --> 00:07:23,949 may run into new technological problems 155 00:07:29,580 --> 00:07:26,229 that had never been faced before so we 156 00:07:32,270 --> 00:07:29,590 had to focus over that four or five year 157 00:07:34,740 --> 00:07:32,280 period in dealing with our critics in 158 00:07:37,950 --> 00:07:34,750 attempting to answer those four major 159 00:07:39,950 --> 00:07:37,960 problems those questions of cost 160 00:07:42,719 --> 00:07:39,960 containment out of skepticism of 161 00:07:45,629 --> 00:07:42,729 performance of risk assessment risk 162 00:07:47,969 --> 00:07:45,639 managed well sepi what was the influence 163 00:07:51,360 --> 00:07:47,979 of Apollo and shuttle on your program at 164 00:07:53,550 --> 00:07:51,370 that time I think we can best answer 165 00:07:55,589 --> 00:07:53,560 that question if we walk up now to the 166 00:07:58,200 --> 00:07:55,599 shuttlebay trainer and take a look at 167 00:08:14,590 --> 00:07:58,210 our latest mms spacecraft that's been 168 00:08:19,570 --> 00:08:17,260 now that we're up here dutch i think i 169 00:08:21,250 --> 00:08:19,580 can better explain the impact and the 170 00:08:22,960 --> 00:08:21,260 influences of both the Apollo and the 171 00:08:26,400 --> 00:08:22,970 shuttle program had on our spacecraft 172 00:08:29,350 --> 00:08:26,410 architecture perhaps the most single 173 00:08:32,830 --> 00:08:29,360 critical dilemma that was posed to us in 174 00:08:36,270 --> 00:08:32,840 the early 70s was the dilemma of having 175 00:08:39,339 --> 00:08:36,280 to deal with how to shuttle eyes and 176 00:08:41,589 --> 00:08:39,349 make our spacecraft systems serviceable 177 00:08:44,380 --> 00:08:41,599 one of the most fundamental problems 178 00:08:46,270 --> 00:08:44,390 that we had was that all our economic 179 00:08:49,870 --> 00:08:46,280 studies were showing study after study 180 00:08:51,670 --> 00:08:49,880 after study the advantages from a cost 181 00:08:53,550 --> 00:08:51,680 control point of view and a foremost 182 00:08:55,780 --> 00:08:53,560 serviceability point of view of 183 00:08:57,900 --> 00:08:55,790 repairing servicing changing out 184 00:09:01,540 --> 00:08:57,910 payloads on orbit for these spacecrafts 185 00:09:03,940 --> 00:09:01,550 by the same token the experience factor 186 00:09:06,190 --> 00:09:03,950 that the agency had had on the Apollo 187 00:09:09,790 --> 00:09:06,200 program was the very high cost of man 188 00:09:15,310 --> 00:09:09,800 rating equipment and our customers view 189 00:09:18,490 --> 00:09:15,320 this as a is basically a very serious 190 00:09:20,980 --> 00:09:18,500 cost control problem and we had to hit 191 00:09:24,340 --> 00:09:20,990 this problem very hard and we had to hit 192 00:09:27,360 --> 00:09:24,350 it hard head on and deal with it and I'm 193 00:09:30,930 --> 00:09:27,370 point by point basis what we did 194 00:09:34,570 --> 00:09:30,940 basically was to rely very heavily on a 195 00:09:36,220 --> 00:09:34,580 very significant series of economic 196 00:09:39,160 --> 00:09:36,230 studies to delte not so much with 197 00:09:41,790 --> 00:09:39,170 serviceability but with how to build a 198 00:09:44,500 --> 00:09:41,800 lower-cost better architectured 199 00:09:48,120 --> 00:09:44,510 multi-mission type of spacecraft system 200 00:09:50,800 --> 00:09:48,130 and what we did with our customers was 201 00:09:54,250 --> 00:09:50,810 convince them that whether we serviced 202 00:09:55,480 --> 00:09:54,260 on orbit or not whether we launched on 203 00:09:57,520 --> 00:09:55,490 the shuttle are launched on a 204 00:10:00,100 --> 00:09:57,530 conventional launch vehicle and our 205 00:10:02,590 --> 00:10:00,110 spacecraft was architecture to fly 206 00:10:05,680 --> 00:10:02,600 either way fly on a delta fly on a Titan 207 00:10:07,390 --> 00:10:05,690 or even or fly on the shuttle regardless 208 00:10:09,130 --> 00:10:07,400 of the method of launch regardless of 209 00:10:11,680 --> 00:10:09,140 whether one considered serviceability or 210 00:10:14,650 --> 00:10:11,690 not the architecture of the spacecraft 211 00:10:17,530 --> 00:10:14,660 was such that it's economies were 212 00:10:20,590 --> 00:10:17,540 significantly lower by virtue of the 213 00:10:22,630 --> 00:10:20,600 fact that we in fact did make it modular 214 00:10:25,270 --> 00:10:22,640 and easy to assemble and test on the 215 00:10:27,390 --> 00:10:25,280 ground and therefore because we reduce 216 00:10:30,690 --> 00:10:27,400 that integration in Tesla a time 217 00:10:32,580 --> 00:10:30,700 we were able to save some thirty to 218 00:10:36,000 --> 00:10:32,590 forty percent of a typical program 219 00:10:37,890 --> 00:10:36,010 caused by negating the need for first of 220 00:10:40,230 --> 00:10:37,900 all redeveloping of the spacecraft and 221 00:10:42,540 --> 00:10:40,240 then shortening typical space graphs 222 00:10:44,700 --> 00:10:42,550 integration and test time with the 223 00:10:46,890 --> 00:10:44,710 observatory instruments and that was the 224 00:10:49,790 --> 00:10:46,900 fundamental approach by which we hit 225 00:10:52,950 --> 00:10:49,800 this problem and eventually I think that 226 00:10:54,330 --> 00:10:52,960 particular approach did persist and we 227 00:10:55,800 --> 00:10:54,340 were finally able to convince our 228 00:10:57,900 --> 00:10:55,810 customers so that was the better way to 229 00:11:00,660 --> 00:10:57,910 go well sepi what were some of the 230 00:11:03,120 --> 00:11:00,670 aspects of those economic studies well 231 00:11:05,910 --> 00:11:03,130 there were eight economic studies run 232 00:11:08,610 --> 00:11:05,920 during the nineteen seventy-two 1975 233 00:11:11,610 --> 00:11:08,620 period and the majority of the economic 234 00:11:13,980 --> 00:11:11,620 studies dealt with the level of 235 00:11:16,080 --> 00:11:13,990 spacecraft modularity from an economic 236 00:11:19,410 --> 00:11:16,090 point of view from a lower cost possible 237 00:11:21,710 --> 00:11:19,420 point of view we dealt with trying to 238 00:11:24,780 --> 00:11:21,720 understand the economic implication of 239 00:11:26,790 --> 00:11:24,790 making an entire spacecraft modular and 240 00:11:29,310 --> 00:11:26,800 throw away able replaceable at the 241 00:11:31,350 --> 00:11:29,320 spacecraft level the next level down was 242 00:11:33,240 --> 00:11:31,360 at the subsystem level and then we 243 00:11:35,130 --> 00:11:33,250 looked at the individual component 244 00:11:38,430 --> 00:11:35,140 modularity that is making individual 245 00:11:40,860 --> 00:11:38,440 components removable and replaceable the 246 00:11:42,750 --> 00:11:40,870 most significant economic study of all 247 00:11:44,730 --> 00:11:42,760 that is when i say significant i mean 248 00:11:47,850 --> 00:11:44,740 that had the most impact and influence 249 00:11:51,000 --> 00:11:47,860 with our potential customers was the 250 00:11:54,390 --> 00:11:51,010 Aerospace Corporation study that dealt 251 00:11:56,400 --> 00:11:54,400 not with servicing but with the economic 252 00:11:59,340 --> 00:11:56,410 benefits associated with having a 253 00:12:02,010 --> 00:11:59,350 standard modular spacecraft that could 254 00:12:04,220 --> 00:12:02,020 accommodate four or five different sets 255 00:12:07,410 --> 00:12:04,230 of missions without redevelopment and 256 00:12:10,320 --> 00:12:07,420 that could be assembled by virtue of its 257 00:12:12,630 --> 00:12:10,330 modularity on the ground significantly 258 00:12:15,810 --> 00:12:12,640 faster and therefore less expensive that 259 00:12:17,460 --> 00:12:15,820 study highlighted the key that our 260 00:12:19,560 --> 00:12:17,470 customers were really looking for the 261 00:12:21,990 --> 00:12:19,570 potential of a thirty to forty percent 262 00:12:24,390 --> 00:12:22,000 savings for each of the specific 263 00:12:28,710 --> 00:12:24,400 missions that would use a so-called 264 00:12:30,120 --> 00:12:28,720 standard or common spacecraft bus well 265 00:12:34,200 --> 00:12:30,130 what were some of the conclusions of 266 00:12:37,320 --> 00:12:34,210 those studies the the conclusions 267 00:12:41,190 --> 00:12:37,330 especially the aerospace conclusion led 268 00:12:43,680 --> 00:12:41,200 our customers to forget about the 269 00:12:47,300 --> 00:12:43,690 sort of speak the risks associated with 270 00:12:49,440 --> 00:12:47,310 servicing they sort of put servicing 271 00:12:51,150 --> 00:12:49,450 requirements out of their mind and it 272 00:12:53,580 --> 00:12:51,160 was very nice for them to say we won't 273 00:12:55,680 --> 00:12:53,590 do anything to preclude servicing but by 274 00:12:58,980 --> 00:12:55,690 the same token we won't have to spend 275 00:13:02,040 --> 00:12:58,990 any money at making a system serviceable 276 00:13:05,220 --> 00:13:02,050 because modularity and rapid ground 277 00:13:07,050 --> 00:13:05,230 integration and test breeds ease of 278 00:13:09,150 --> 00:13:07,060 servicing on orbit and I think of all 279 00:13:12,120 --> 00:13:09,160 the conclusions of one could draw that 280 00:13:13,950 --> 00:13:12,130 was the one that really put the message 281 00:13:16,260 --> 00:13:13,960 across to our customers and everybody 282 00:13:20,610 --> 00:13:16,270 could sort of speak be the Maytag could 283 00:13:23,040 --> 00:13:20,620 watch the Maytag repairmen leaning on 284 00:13:25,230 --> 00:13:23,050 his washing machine and should the day 285 00:13:28,140 --> 00:13:25,240 ever arise that we did have to conduct 286 00:13:30,510 --> 00:13:28,150 an emergency repair maintenance the 287 00:13:34,620 --> 00:13:30,520 system could in fact be compatible to do 288 00:13:38,010 --> 00:13:34,630 it well semi wasn't really difficult 289 00:13:39,900 --> 00:13:38,020 selling upper management well I guess I 290 00:13:42,930 --> 00:13:39,910 would have to say yes and so it took us 291 00:13:44,910 --> 00:13:42,940 five years to do that I think that in 292 00:13:47,400 --> 00:13:44,920 looking back in the process of trying to 293 00:13:50,330 --> 00:13:47,410 convince upper management we had to deal 294 00:13:54,060 --> 00:13:50,340 with some very specific questions and 295 00:13:57,510 --> 00:13:54,070 convince the upper management at NASA 296 00:14:00,090 --> 00:13:57,520 headquarters that this plunge was was 297 00:14:03,060 --> 00:14:00,100 worth was worth their investment and was 298 00:14:05,370 --> 00:14:03,070 worth taking a risk to do and the way we 299 00:14:07,980 --> 00:14:05,380 did that was first of all find that 300 00:14:12,270 --> 00:14:07,990 first willing customer that first 301 00:14:15,990 --> 00:14:12,280 program who by either necessity or by 302 00:14:18,120 --> 00:14:16,000 cost constraints was willing to join 303 00:14:22,640 --> 00:14:18,130 with us and that program happened to be 304 00:14:27,180 --> 00:14:22,650 the solar max mission spacecraft program 305 00:14:29,130 --> 00:14:27,190 the process by which we sold them on the 306 00:14:30,690 --> 00:14:29,140 approach was first of all we convinced 307 00:14:32,340 --> 00:14:30,700 them that we could launch on any launch 308 00:14:34,800 --> 00:14:32,350 vehicle that we did not have to wait for 309 00:14:38,280 --> 00:14:34,810 the shuttle we could launch on a delta 310 00:14:45,270 --> 00:14:38,290 or a Titan and the next process was the 311 00:14:47,810 --> 00:14:45,280 process of invincible risk by virtue of 312 00:14:50,430 --> 00:14:47,820 the amount of breadboarding and 313 00:14:52,110 --> 00:14:50,440 Technology testing we were doing here on 314 00:14:53,449 --> 00:14:52,120 the ground and got it over this five 315 00:14:56,809 --> 00:14:53,459 year period 316 00:14:59,929 --> 00:14:56,819 the last aspect had to do with our 317 00:15:02,900 --> 00:14:59,939 convincing null hinners that from a 318 00:15:05,090 --> 00:15:02,910 solar max observatory point of view from 319 00:15:09,109 --> 00:15:05,100 an agency point of view from a 320 00:15:12,169 --> 00:15:09,119 futuristic thinking that on-orbit 321 00:15:16,009 --> 00:15:12,179 servicing down the pike a modular 322 00:15:18,079 --> 00:15:16,019 spacecraft up front more economical 323 00:15:20,509 --> 00:15:18,089 approach for not just a solar max 324 00:15:24,499 --> 00:15:20,519 mission but for landsat missions and 325 00:15:26,600 --> 00:15:24,509 future uars missions and so on that a 326 00:15:28,689 --> 00:15:26,610 common spacecraft that could take care 327 00:15:31,419 --> 00:15:28,699 of four or five different types of 328 00:15:33,710 --> 00:15:31,429 mission constraints requirements and 329 00:15:36,650 --> 00:15:33,720 configurations would be best for the 330 00:15:39,619 --> 00:15:36,660 agency and no hitters had the wisdom to 331 00:15:42,169 --> 00:15:39,629 step up to that and said yes we will 332 00:15:52,720 --> 00:15:42,179 take the plunge we will go with this 333 00:15:57,129 --> 00:15:54,460 we're fortunate to have with us today 334 00:15:59,620 --> 00:15:57,139 dr. Nowell Henner's the associate deputy 335 00:16:02,019 --> 00:15:59,630 administrator of NASA and dr. Anthony 336 00:16:03,790 --> 00:16:02,029 kallio the vice president for management 337 00:16:07,810 --> 00:16:03,800 and operations at the planning research 338 00:16:09,850 --> 00:16:07,820 corporation in October of 1976 dr. 339 00:16:11,290 --> 00:16:09,860 Henner's the god ur team working a new 340 00:16:14,139 --> 00:16:11,300 breed of spacecraft called the 341 00:16:16,629 --> 00:16:14,149 multi-mission modular spacecraft came to 342 00:16:18,790 --> 00:16:16,639 NASA headquarters to see if they can get 343 00:16:21,400 --> 00:16:18,800 a decision to use the solar maximum 344 00:16:22,960 --> 00:16:21,410 mission with the mms spacecraft what 345 00:16:25,720 --> 00:16:22,970 were some of the factors that you had to 346 00:16:28,509 --> 00:16:25,730 consider in making that decision touch 347 00:16:30,699 --> 00:16:28,519 when the goddard folks came down to 348 00:16:33,430 --> 00:16:30,709 headquarters talking about the mms 349 00:16:35,740 --> 00:16:33,440 approach right off the bat it was more 350 00:16:38,110 --> 00:16:35,750 than just the solar max mission they do 351 00:16:39,939 --> 00:16:38,120 realize that I had a potential for lots 352 00:16:42,340 --> 00:16:39,949 of missions and in fact that was one of 353 00:16:44,650 --> 00:16:42,350 the benefits being advertised for the 354 00:16:47,079 --> 00:16:44,660 mms approach that you use the same basic 355 00:16:49,000 --> 00:16:47,089 design for many missions I'll come back 356 00:16:50,769 --> 00:16:49,010 to that we had though at the time 357 00:16:53,439 --> 00:16:50,779 something called the low-cost systems 358 00:16:56,170 --> 00:16:53,449 office under the chief engineer Walt 359 00:16:59,019 --> 00:16:56,180 Williams at that time they did the basic 360 00:17:01,509 --> 00:16:59,029 economic studies of the mms and 361 00:17:03,160 --> 00:17:01,519 concluded that if you were to do just 362 00:17:05,049 --> 00:17:03,170 one you wouldn't really reap the 363 00:17:07,210 --> 00:17:05,059 benefits of it but that if you could buy 364 00:17:08,949 --> 00:17:07,220 a block of four or five spacecraft 365 00:17:12,610 --> 00:17:08,959 that's what you'd really see the return 366 00:17:15,340 --> 00:17:12,620 on the investment now we realize that 367 00:17:17,530 --> 00:17:15,350 the intangibles were going to save money 368 00:17:20,289 --> 00:17:17,540 also not just the acquisition but the 369 00:17:22,809 --> 00:17:20,299 the common design common components the 370 00:17:24,909 --> 00:17:22,819 sparing philosophy the fact that the 371 00:17:27,039 --> 00:17:24,919 modular approach the serviceability 372 00:17:29,500 --> 00:17:27,049 would let you do the testing on the 373 00:17:32,770 --> 00:17:29,510 ground and a lot easier way than 374 00:17:35,320 --> 00:17:32,780 typically from the inside out but then 375 00:17:38,190 --> 00:17:35,330 we came up against our friends over at 376 00:17:41,710 --> 00:17:38,200 OMB the office of management and budget 377 00:17:44,020 --> 00:17:41,720 they understood the concept and said 378 00:17:46,419 --> 00:17:44,030 fine we'll let you go ahead with the 379 00:17:49,419 --> 00:17:46,429 solar max mission and the mms but we're 380 00:17:52,780 --> 00:17:49,429 not going to approve a block by a five 381 00:17:55,150 --> 00:17:52,790 spacecraft their argument was that we 382 00:17:57,580 --> 00:17:55,160 didn't have mission approval for the 383 00:17:58,930 --> 00:17:57,590 other four spacecraft even though we 384 00:18:01,210 --> 00:17:58,940 could say we know things are coming 385 00:18:03,370 --> 00:18:01,220 downstream we typically get a new 386 00:18:05,020 --> 00:18:03,380 mission approved every year that didn't 387 00:18:06,500 --> 00:18:05,030 wash with them so they r approved the 388 00:18:08,600 --> 00:18:06,510 only for the solar 389 00:18:11,090 --> 00:18:08,610 max mission at that time and Lance I 390 00:18:14,180 --> 00:18:11,100 just had to wait till his time came in 391 00:18:15,770 --> 00:18:14,190 the Landsat subject brings us to dr. 392 00:18:17,960 --> 00:18:15,780 Kelly at the time you are working with 393 00:18:19,850 --> 00:18:17,970 dr. hunters on this project but we're 394 00:18:22,310 --> 00:18:19,860 not yet the associate administrator for 395 00:18:23,750 --> 00:18:22,320 Earth applications the office that would 396 00:18:25,820 --> 00:18:23,760 later have responsibility for that 397 00:18:28,130 --> 00:18:25,830 spacecraft now where were some of the 398 00:18:31,280 --> 00:18:28,140 considerations that you had to make in 399 00:18:34,040 --> 00:18:31,290 this decision in that timeframe October 400 00:18:36,050 --> 00:18:34,050 76 I believe one of the problems that 401 00:18:38,780 --> 00:18:36,060 was going on with a another budget issue 402 00:18:41,360 --> 00:18:38,790 and even though all of us trained by 403 00:18:43,850 --> 00:18:41,370 NASA or know the importance of balancing 404 00:18:47,090 --> 00:18:43,860 performance cost and schedule a Landsat 405 00:18:48,470 --> 00:18:47,100 was having a difficult time with the 406 00:18:53,060 --> 00:18:48,480 office of management and budget because 407 00:18:55,100 --> 00:18:53,070 the project was not approved the way it 408 00:18:57,560 --> 00:18:55,110 was originally proposed by NASA that was 409 00:18:59,510 --> 00:18:57,570 to carry two instruments a multispectral 410 00:19:02,180 --> 00:18:59,520 scanner which was the old instrument and 411 00:19:03,620 --> 00:19:02,190 a new thematic mapper it was believed at 412 00:19:06,560 --> 00:19:03,630 that point in time that if it was an 413 00:19:08,390 --> 00:19:06,570 experimental program that the thematic 414 00:19:10,490 --> 00:19:08,400 mapper was the only instrument was that 415 00:19:12,950 --> 00:19:10,500 was needed and the multispectral scanner 416 00:19:16,520 --> 00:19:12,960 was not needed so there was the project 417 00:19:19,100 --> 00:19:16,530 was in the throes of being redefined as 418 00:19:21,200 --> 00:19:19,110 to between Earth NASA and the office of 419 00:19:23,570 --> 00:19:21,210 management budget so it was unclear what 420 00:19:27,110 --> 00:19:23,580 the spacecraft design would be secondly 421 00:19:28,490 --> 00:19:27,120 if we had to go to such a design for any 422 00:19:30,890 --> 00:19:28,500 spacecraft whether it was a space 423 00:19:32,870 --> 00:19:30,900 science or an application spacecraft it 424 00:19:34,850 --> 00:19:32,880 would have to be dual compatible because 425 00:19:37,370 --> 00:19:34,860 if it were to fly on the shuttle 426 00:19:40,610 --> 00:19:37,380 ultimately it would also have to in the 427 00:19:42,680 --> 00:19:40,620 in the early years fly on a expendable 428 00:19:44,360 --> 00:19:42,690 launch vehicle and then finally for 429 00:19:46,220 --> 00:19:44,370 those who were interested in polar 430 00:19:47,720 --> 00:19:46,230 orbits we would have to fly out of the 431 00:19:50,270 --> 00:19:47,730 Western test range that it'd have to be 432 00:19:52,430 --> 00:19:50,280 compatibility with that facility so this 433 00:19:55,040 --> 00:19:52,440 presented a number of uncertainties for 434 00:19:56,780 --> 00:19:55,050 a whole series and of a spacecraft that 435 00:19:59,900 --> 00:19:56,790 were being considered at that period of 436 00:20:02,690 --> 00:19:59,910 time well in summary considering that 437 00:20:05,960 --> 00:20:02,700 whole time frame from 76 on to when 438 00:20:08,120 --> 00:20:05,970 solar max flu what kind of lessons 439 00:20:11,000 --> 00:20:08,130 learned can you share with the current 440 00:20:14,790 --> 00:20:11,010 and new managers within NASA well the 441 00:20:17,550 --> 00:20:14,800 gutter team back in 77 as they have 442 00:20:20,880 --> 00:20:17,560 in the past continue to be had a great 443 00:20:23,870 --> 00:20:20,890 ideas and the idea of the multi-mission 444 00:20:26,250 --> 00:20:23,880 spacecraft was a very creative one and 445 00:20:28,370 --> 00:20:26,260 the second part of it was they were very 446 00:20:30,630 --> 00:20:28,380 persistent with that whole notion of 447 00:20:33,660 --> 00:20:30,640 getting the multi-mission spacecraft 448 00:20:36,750 --> 00:20:33,670 phone I was not a supporter at the time 449 00:20:39,860 --> 00:20:36,760 and it turned out through their bright 450 00:20:42,660 --> 00:20:39,870 ideas and their persistence or tenacity 451 00:20:44,280 --> 00:20:42,670 persevered and we got to see in the 452 00:20:46,590 --> 00:20:44,290 nineteen eighty-four timeframe for the 453 00:20:49,080 --> 00:20:46,600 recovery of a solar max mission and its 454 00:20:51,390 --> 00:20:49,090 retrofitting and placing it back in the 455 00:20:54,120 --> 00:20:51,400 service that the concept that they had a 456 00:20:56,610 --> 00:20:54,130 good concept well thought out well 457 00:20:59,250 --> 00:20:56,620 engineered with the persistence of that 458 00:21:01,380 --> 00:20:59,260 team is leading the way for the future 459 00:21:03,810 --> 00:21:01,390 to the space station in this shuttle so 460 00:21:05,520 --> 00:21:03,820 it was a good idea and with good ideas 461 00:21:08,130 --> 00:21:05,530 staying with that I think is an 462 00:21:10,740 --> 00:21:08,140 important point for NASA engineers to 463 00:21:12,720 --> 00:21:10,750 consider what doctor enters what kind of 464 00:21:15,570 --> 00:21:12,730 summary lessons learned would you like 465 00:21:17,550 --> 00:21:15,580 to pass on to the new managers Dutch I 466 00:21:20,700 --> 00:21:17,560 think there are a number there Tony 467 00:21:23,970 --> 00:21:20,710 touched on on several of them clearly 468 00:21:26,910 --> 00:21:23,980 having a solid technical product to sell 469 00:21:29,820 --> 00:21:26,920 has to be number one without that forget 470 00:21:32,730 --> 00:21:29,830 it then once you get past that you've 471 00:21:34,680 --> 00:21:32,740 got to have a salesman and I'll put it 472 00:21:36,360 --> 00:21:34,690 that way you're out there in the field 473 00:21:39,810 --> 00:21:36,370 you've got to come in and convince a 474 00:21:41,520 --> 00:21:39,820 range of people here at headquarters and 475 00:21:43,860 --> 00:21:41,530 organizations first you've got the 476 00:21:45,930 --> 00:21:43,870 program office I say the program office 477 00:21:47,550 --> 00:21:45,940 that's your first customer but then on 478 00:21:49,200 --> 00:21:47,560 something like the mms which went across 479 00:21:51,210 --> 00:21:49,210 many program officers you had to touch 480 00:21:53,970 --> 00:21:51,220 base with many and get people to 481 00:21:55,700 --> 00:21:53,980 understand that there was a payoff and 482 00:21:59,130 --> 00:21:55,710 coming together on something like the 483 00:22:01,050 --> 00:21:59,140 mms then you had to work the controllers 484 00:22:02,700 --> 00:22:01,060 office you had to work the low-cost 485 00:22:05,130 --> 00:22:02,710 systems office and you had to get over 486 00:22:06,720 --> 00:22:05,140 and work OMB so you've got to understand 487 00:22:08,580 --> 00:22:06,730 when you're out in the field that you 488 00:22:10,550 --> 00:22:08,590 can't go to one point head coach but 489 00:22:12,960 --> 00:22:10,560 you've gotta play across the board and 490 00:22:17,700 --> 00:22:12,970 aggregate the support for what you're 491 00:22:20,880 --> 00:22:17,710 trying to do Tony mentioned being 492 00:22:23,940 --> 00:22:20,890 tenacious in this project I think you've 493 00:22:25,990 --> 00:22:23,950 seen all mostly the ultimate tenacious 494 00:22:30,400 --> 00:22:26,000 yes a leader 495 00:22:32,740 --> 00:22:30,410 and it's epi we've got that sepia is a 496 00:22:34,360 --> 00:22:32,750 bulldog I could still feel that Keith 497 00:22:38,290 --> 00:22:34,370 marks up here in the neck he doesn't 498 00:22:40,750 --> 00:22:38,300 like old sepi so believed that what he 499 00:22:42,490 --> 00:22:40,760 was doing was right after spending a 500 00:22:45,070 --> 00:22:42,500 while with him he just fell in said yeah 501 00:22:46,810 --> 00:22:45,080 he's right the other thing he did of 502 00:22:49,360 --> 00:22:46,820 course and his team was that they 503 00:22:51,730 --> 00:22:49,370 produced they promised a certain product 504 00:22:53,770 --> 00:22:51,740 on a schedule and they brought it in and 505 00:22:55,060 --> 00:22:53,780 we're seeing that now through the rest 506 00:22:57,250 --> 00:22:55,070 of the program even though we started 507 00:23:00,340 --> 00:22:57,260 with just solarmax it did get used for 508 00:23:02,620 --> 00:23:00,350 landsat it became used on the upper 509 00:23:04,540 --> 00:23:02,630 atmosphere research satellite there are 510 00:23:06,010 --> 00:23:04,550 components of it modules on the gamma 511 00:23:08,500 --> 00:23:06,020 ray observatory and there are pieces of 512 00:23:10,270 --> 00:23:08,510 it in the space telescope and it really 513 00:23:11,800 --> 00:23:10,280 has formed the basis for a lot of our 514 00:23:15,850 --> 00:23:11,810 thinking on the polar platform for the 515 00:23:18,550 --> 00:23:15,860 space station there's one last thing the 516 00:23:20,200 --> 00:23:18,560 Goddard management at the time came 517 00:23:22,810 --> 00:23:20,210 Seppi a lot of leeway in the project 518 00:23:24,850 --> 00:23:22,820 they believed in and said go to it so it 519 00:23:26,410 --> 00:23:24,860 was an environment which encouraged that 520 00:23:28,000 --> 00:23:26,420 innovation and that's something we've 521 00:23:29,890 --> 00:23:28,010 got to be sure we keep up so these 522 00:23:32,440 --> 00:23:29,900 bright ideas can surface in the system 523 00:23:34,930 --> 00:23:32,450 get through it gets old thank you very 524 00:23:37,330 --> 00:23:34,940 much dr. Henner's and dr. Kelly no i'm 525 00:23:40,090 --> 00:23:37,340 sure that the nasa work for us and 526 00:23:42,190 --> 00:23:40,100 specially the young NASA managers have a 527 00:23:43,810 --> 00:23:42,200 better appreciation for how management 528 00:23:45,280 --> 00:23:43,820 decisions are made at the associate 529 00:23:47,350 --> 00:23:45,290 administrator level thank you very much 530 00:23:49,630 --> 00:23:47,360 and now let's go to Goddard Space Flight 531 00:23:53,560 --> 00:23:49,640 Center and see the multi-mission modular 532 00:23:55,570 --> 00:23:53,570 spacecraft well semi what was the impact 533 00:23:59,980 --> 00:23:55,580 of the failure of the solar max 534 00:24:04,090 --> 00:23:59,990 spacecraft on your program well looking 535 00:24:07,540 --> 00:24:04,100 back in time I feel that the impact of 536 00:24:09,550 --> 00:24:07,550 solar max failure in fact the fine 537 00:24:14,170 --> 00:24:09,560 pointing failure of the attitude control 538 00:24:18,370 --> 00:24:14,180 subsystem represented both a tragedy in 539 00:24:21,790 --> 00:24:18,380 a triumph a tragedy in the sense that we 540 00:24:24,760 --> 00:24:21,800 launched the spacecraft with two years 541 00:24:27,610 --> 00:24:24,770 of observation objectives and after the 542 00:24:29,230 --> 00:24:27,620 first year we lost our fine pointing we 543 00:24:31,600 --> 00:24:29,240 had all the solar physicists and 544 00:24:33,850 --> 00:24:31,610 ground-based observatories all over the 545 00:24:37,419 --> 00:24:33,860 world making simultaneous observations 546 00:24:39,010 --> 00:24:37,429 with the solar max physicist here at 547 00:24:41,590 --> 00:24:39,020 Goddard to 548 00:24:44,350 --> 00:24:41,600 to uncover some of the big secrets of 549 00:24:46,030 --> 00:24:44,360 solar flare theory when we lost by 550 00:24:48,820 --> 00:24:46,040 appointing we lost much of that 551 00:24:52,380 --> 00:24:48,830 capability and I think that was 552 00:24:55,210 --> 00:24:52,390 certainly an adversity on the other hand 553 00:24:57,310 --> 00:24:55,220 by virtue of the fact that we have 554 00:25:00,190 --> 00:24:57,320 designed the spacecraft which in fact 555 00:25:02,530 --> 00:25:00,200 was serviceable on orbit since we had 556 00:25:05,200 --> 00:25:02,540 built this flight support system to go 557 00:25:07,720 --> 00:25:05,210 up and take care of that problem and 558 00:25:12,310 --> 00:25:07,730 since we had a desire as an agency to 559 00:25:14,680 --> 00:25:12,320 basically put our faith in the 560 00:25:17,890 --> 00:25:14,690 transportation system which we said 561 00:25:20,560 --> 00:25:17,900 could do repair and should do repair of 562 00:25:24,960 --> 00:25:20,570 satellites in orbit we put all those 563 00:25:29,530 --> 00:25:24,970 aspects together just doing going for it 564 00:25:32,290 --> 00:25:29,540 represented a confidence represented an 565 00:25:35,110 --> 00:25:32,300 objective for the agency of meeting its 566 00:25:38,170 --> 00:25:35,120 goal of understanding where the 567 00:25:39,880 --> 00:25:38,180 development of resources and what their 568 00:25:42,370 --> 00:25:39,890 intention was in the first place and 569 00:25:43,740 --> 00:25:42,380 bringing all elements of the agency 570 00:25:48,780 --> 00:25:43,750 together the manned spaceflight 571 00:25:50,920 --> 00:25:48,790 transportation element the scientist the 572 00:25:53,290 --> 00:25:50,930 observatory builders bringing them all 573 00:25:55,600 --> 00:25:53,300 together and doing a very successful 574 00:25:58,360 --> 00:25:55,610 repair mission represented a significant 575 00:26:00,640 --> 00:25:58,370 triumph and all that one has to do is 576 00:26:03,400 --> 00:26:00,650 look at what happened in the next 12 577 00:26:06,130 --> 00:26:03,410 months after the successful solar max 578 00:26:09,370 --> 00:26:06,140 repair mission first of all we did 579 00:26:11,770 --> 00:26:09,380 retrieved two spacecrafts Westar and 580 00:26:17,050 --> 00:26:11,780 palapa both of which are going to be 581 00:26:19,570 --> 00:26:17,060 relaunched next we repaired sin com4 and 582 00:26:22,390 --> 00:26:19,580 put it up into orbit into its 583 00:26:26,080 --> 00:26:22,400 operational regime or it's working fine 584 00:26:29,680 --> 00:26:26,090 to this day solar max which was repaired 585 00:26:31,870 --> 00:26:29,690 in 1984 is working fine and still 586 00:26:34,720 --> 00:26:31,880 collecting very valuable scientific data 587 00:26:38,290 --> 00:26:34,730 and in fact for the last four and a half 588 00:26:40,000 --> 00:26:38,300 to five years he has been operating fine 589 00:26:42,370 --> 00:26:40,010 and being able to collect some 590 00:26:45,100 --> 00:26:42,380 significant scientific data as the solar 591 00:26:47,620 --> 00:26:45,110 cycle is going back up and I think you 592 00:26:50,680 --> 00:26:47,630 put all those aspects together it 593 00:26:54,850 --> 00:26:50,690 represented this this triumph aspect as 594 00:26:59,150 --> 00:26:57,050 what's that be looking back to nineteen 595 00:27:02,060 --> 00:26:59,160 seventy when your challenge was to get 596 00:27:05,750 --> 00:27:02,070 more science for less cost what advice 597 00:27:08,630 --> 00:27:05,760 can you give your new project managers 598 00:27:10,460 --> 00:27:08,640 and what have you learned well I think 599 00:27:12,460 --> 00:27:10,470 in terms of what have we learned and 600 00:27:14,930 --> 00:27:12,470 what the accomplishments have been 601 00:27:18,260 --> 00:27:14,940 looking back and looking first of all 602 00:27:20,870 --> 00:27:18,270 here at UA RS which represents the sixth 603 00:27:23,660 --> 00:27:20,880 or seventh production spacecraft common 604 00:27:25,490 --> 00:27:23,670 to several different missions and even 605 00:27:27,710 --> 00:27:25,500 more importantly the fact that this 606 00:27:30,340 --> 00:27:27,720 particular ACS subsystem was the one 607 00:27:32,920 --> 00:27:30,350 that flew for four years on solar max 608 00:27:35,090 --> 00:27:32,930 was brought back from space and 609 00:27:36,710 --> 00:27:35,100 refurbished twenty-five to thirty 610 00:27:39,260 --> 00:27:36,720 percent of the cost of a new spacecraft 611 00:27:41,360 --> 00:27:39,270 and now we'll be flying again on a 612 00:27:44,000 --> 00:27:41,370 spacecraft almost three times more 613 00:27:46,010 --> 00:27:44,010 complicated and expensive I think that 614 00:27:49,040 --> 00:27:46,020 that basically is indicative of the fact 615 00:27:51,830 --> 00:27:49,050 that we have accomplished the goal of 616 00:27:53,960 --> 00:27:51,840 reducing cost of future missions by 617 00:27:56,660 --> 00:27:53,970 virtue of our being able to build and 618 00:28:00,680 --> 00:27:56,670 serve as common modular spacecrafts on 619 00:28:04,910 --> 00:28:00,690 the ground and and relaunch and maintain 620 00:28:08,210 --> 00:28:04,920 some form of a standard spacecraft 621 00:28:09,800 --> 00:28:08,220 production base and I think that that I 622 00:28:12,920 --> 00:28:09,810 feel very good about that accomplishment 623 00:28:15,920 --> 00:28:12,930 I think as far as the the lessons 624 00:28:19,640 --> 00:28:15,930 learned for future project managers the 625 00:28:21,650 --> 00:28:19,650 most fundamental reality today is that 626 00:28:24,260 --> 00:28:21,660 the cost pressures of the 80s and the 627 00:28:27,320 --> 00:28:24,270 90s are even more severe than the cost 628 00:28:31,040 --> 00:28:27,330 pressures of the 70s and for a project 629 00:28:34,040 --> 00:28:31,050 manager to effectively be able to cost 630 00:28:37,370 --> 00:28:34,050 manage and schedule manager program he's 631 00:28:41,660 --> 00:28:37,380 got to be dogmatically pragmatic he's 632 00:28:43,880 --> 00:28:41,670 got to make hard decisions on trade-offs 633 00:28:47,510 --> 00:28:43,890 between cost and performance and 634 00:28:49,690 --> 00:28:47,520 schedule and those trade-offs have to be 635 00:28:52,610 --> 00:28:49,700 made in a rather timely fashion today 636 00:28:56,720 --> 00:28:52,620 much more so I believed and they were in 637 00:29:00,130 --> 00:28:56,730 a period of the 70s I think that by the 638 00:29:04,340 --> 00:29:00,140 same token that project manager today 639 00:29:06,259 --> 00:29:04,350 has to be an astute philosophical leader 640 00:29:09,079 --> 00:29:06,269 he cannot be afraid 641 00:29:11,269 --> 00:29:09,089 of basically grabbing the cutting edge 642 00:29:12,769 --> 00:29:11,279 of technology in any given area whether 643 00:29:14,959 --> 00:29:12,779 it be in the scientific instrument area 644 00:29:17,469 --> 00:29:14,969 or in the spacecraft performance area 645 00:29:21,259 --> 00:29:17,479 and moving ahead with that technology 646 00:29:23,389 --> 00:29:21,269 without fear he's got to be determined 647 00:29:25,909 --> 00:29:23,399 he's got to be an astute philosophical 648 00:29:29,539 --> 00:29:25,919 leader and he's got to bring his team 649 00:29:35,239 --> 00:29:29,549 along with them in order to make true 650 00:29:37,549 --> 00:29:35,249 progress in this space arena project 651 00:29:39,889 --> 00:29:37,559 management is really a bottom line art 652 00:29:41,629 --> 00:29:39,899 form of leading a group of technical and 653 00:29:45,139 --> 00:29:41,639 business people into accomplishing a 654 00:29:47,089 --> 00:29:45,149 common goal and that the success that a 655 00:29:50,989 --> 00:29:47,099 project manager can have is directly 656 00:29:53,539 --> 00:29:50,999 dependent on what I call the three P's 657 00:29:58,099 --> 00:29:53,549 of project management persistence 658 00:30:00,409 --> 00:29:58,109 patience and people dedication project 659 00:30:03,619 --> 00:30:00,419 managers got to have that goal he's got 660 00:30:04,999 --> 00:30:03,629 to have a fervent desire and demonstrate 661 00:30:09,139 --> 00:30:05,009 that fervent desire of accomplishing 662 00:30:13,430 --> 00:30:09,149 that goal and finally touch the most 663 00:30:16,339 --> 00:30:13,440 important point of all is that a project 664 00:30:18,829 --> 00:30:16,349 manager cannot succeed unless he can 665 00:30:22,209 --> 00:30:18,839 inspire his team of technical and 666 00:30:25,729 --> 00:30:22,219 business experts to follow him and 667 00:30:29,119 --> 00:30:25,739 that's what project management i think 668 00:30:31,399 --> 00:30:29,129 is all about well suppy thank you very 669 00:30:33,709 --> 00:30:31,409 much for your help and your guidance and 670 00:30:35,119 --> 00:30:33,719 wisdom and on behalf of the NASA program 671 00:30:37,339 --> 00:30:35,129 and project management training and 672 00:30:38,749 --> 00:30:37,349 development initiative one thank you and 673 00:30:40,159 --> 00:30:38,759 your Goddard team and the NASA 674 00:30:42,440 --> 00:30:40,169 headquarters team for making this 675 00:30:44,209 --> 00:30:42,450 training film possible well that's thank 676 00:30:48,799 --> 00:30:44,219 you very much I thoroughly enjoyed it it 677 00:30:50,829 --> 00:30:48,809 was idea thank you thank you you have 678 00:30:53,119 --> 00:30:50,839 just seen a NASA pilot video program 679 00:30:54,709 --> 00:30:53,129 prepared as part of the program and 680 00:30:57,469 --> 00:30:54,719 project management training and 681 00:30:59,869 --> 00:30:57,479 development initiative this video series 682 00:31:02,239 --> 00:30:59,879 is intended to be a vehicle to which 683 00:31:03,769 --> 00:31:02,249 former and present NASA managers can 684 00:31:06,649 --> 00:31:03,779 share their experiences with other 685 00:31:09,709 --> 00:31:06,659 employees especially those interested in 686 00:31:11,839 --> 00:31:09,719 management the video programs in this 687 00:31:13,909 --> 00:31:11,849 series focus on the exchange of 688 00:31:16,609 --> 00:31:13,919 approaches in the informal communication 689 00:31:20,060 --> 00:31:16,619 of various NASA project management 690 00:31:21,710 --> 00:31:20,070 styles the video programs are geared to 691 00:31:24,560 --> 00:31:21,720 gathering and sharing the individual and 692 00:31:26,860 --> 00:31:24,570 team experiences and lessons learned and 693 00:31:29,000 --> 00:31:26,870 the managers of past NASA projects 694 00:31:31,540 --> 00:31:29,010 hopefully these experiences will be 695 00:31:34,640 --> 00:31:31,550 useful to the future cadre of managers 696 00:31:37,340 --> 00:31:34,650 each program in the series will document 697 00:31:39,470 --> 00:31:37,350 one project in an educational format 698 00:31:41,750 --> 00:31:39,480 containing a brief history or summary of 699 00:31:43,940 --> 00:31:41,760 the project followed by a discussion on 700 00:31:47,720 --> 00:31:43,950 how these people managed and overcame 701 00:31:49,370 --> 00:31:47,730 their program obstacles the audience 702 00:31:51,740 --> 00:31:49,380 will be introduced to different 703 00:31:54,320 --> 00:31:51,750 real-life project scenarios and through 704 00:31:55,640 --> 00:31:54,330 the videos will better understand why 705 00:31:58,400 --> 00:31:55,650 certain management approaches were 706 00:32:01,790 --> 00:31:58,410 selected and why some styles have been 707 00:32:03,950 --> 00:32:01,800 more successful than others each program 708 00:32:07,160 --> 00:32:03,960 will discuss detailed information about 709 00:32:08,980 --> 00:32:07,170 the project's objectives and history is 710 00:32:11,930 --> 00:32:08,990 told by the project managers themselves 711 00:32:14,380 --> 00:32:11,940 the audience for the series is the NASA 712 00:32:16,550 --> 00:32:14,390 program and project management workforce 713 00:32:18,590 --> 00:32:16,560 especially the new less experienced 714 00:32:21,470 --> 00:32:18,600 managers who may not be familiar with 715 00:32:23,240 --> 00:32:21,480 the details of past projects this 716 00:32:25,280 --> 00:32:23,250 program will bring together NASA's 717 00:32:27,380 --> 00:32:25,290 seasoned professionals and capture many 718 00:32:29,390 --> 00:32:27,390 of their projects in brief visual 719 00:32:31,910 --> 00:32:29,400 learning sessions which will be made 720 00:32:33,200 --> 00:32:31,920 available to a broad audience we hope 721 00:32:35,420 --> 00:32:33,210 this series will aid in the development 722 00:32:37,430 --> 00:32:35,430 of a corporate memory that will benefit 723 00:32:40,070 --> 00:32:37,440 both current and future generations of 724 00:32:41,630 --> 00:32:40,080 NASA personnel thanks for listening and